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Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including anxi-
ety, fear, powerlessness, and vulnerability. There is much debate on the
‘therapeutic’ or ‘helping’ nurse–patient relationship. However, despite
the current agenda regarding patient-centred care, the literature con-
cerning the development of good interpersonal responses and the view













, nursing ethics is dominated by the traditional
obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontol-
ogy. I critically examine these theories and the role of duty-based
notions in both general ethics and nursing practice. Because of well-
established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based moral theories are
incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. I examine the work of
Hursthouse on virtue ethics’ action guidance and the v-rules. I argue
that the moral virtues and a strong (action-guiding) version of virtue
ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I
develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-
based approach to nursing. The latter is characterized by three features:
(1) exercising the moral virtues such as compassion; (2) using judge-
ment; and (3) using moral wisdom, understood to include at least moral
perception, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination. Merits and prob-
lems of the virtue-based approach are examined. I relate the work of
MacIntyre to nursing and I conceive nursing as a practice: nurses who
exercise the virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the
practice of nursing and thus prevent the marginalization of the virtues.
The strong practice-based version of virtue ethics proposed is context-
dependent, particularist, and relational. Several areas for future philo-
sophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to
develop this account yet further.
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In this paper, I argue for a strong – action-guiding –
version of virtue ethics for contemporary nursing
practice. In 
 
Illness, emotions, and the nurse–patient
relationship
 
 section, I examine some typical emo-
tional responses to illness, discuss several aspects of
the therapeutic nurse–patient relationship, and
acknowledge the importance of qualities such as





 section, I turn to moral philosophy and exam-
ine the moral virtues including some merits and prob-
lems. Next in 
 
Obligation-based moral theories in
general and nursing ethics
 
 section, I critique obliga-
tion-based moral theories in both general and nursing
ethics. I reject these moral theories because of their
incompleteness and inadequacy. In 
 
Virtue ethics:
tenets, types, merits, and problems
 
 section, I provide
an overview of virtue ethics and acknowledge the
plausibility of a strong version of virtue ethics. In 
 
The
virtue-based approach to moral decision making in
nursing practice
 
 section, I provide a tentative account
of a virtue-based approach to moral decision making
in nursing practice. In the final section, 
 
MacIntyre’s
account of the virtues and the virtue-based approach
in nursing practice
 
, I relate the work of MacIntyre
(1985) to my conception of the virtue-based
approach.
 





Illness can affect one at any point in the lifespan.
Illness becomes part of the person’s life. It can inter-
fere with and cause problems in one’s daily living.
One’s experience of illness is a personal phenome-
non; illness affects people in markedly different ways.
During infancy and childhood, children are depen-
dent on others – usually parents and guardians – to
take care of them and help them to fare well in life.
Later, in old age, the reverse might occur: children
may be involved in helping and caring for their par-
ents. During one’s life, help and support is sometimes
required from other people including one’s spouse,
friends, and family members. The need for help is
intensified during periods of both physical and mental
illness; during such illness, humans need other
humans to help them survive, recover, and fare well.
Illness is one of the features that can characterize
one’s life; this is especially true if one suffers from
prolonged and chronic illness, either physical or men-
tal. The extent to which illness becomes part of, or
takes over, one’s life depends on several factors
including the causation, symptamatology, and prog-
nosis of the illness and individual personality traits





Narayanasamy, 2004). Irrespective of these factors,
illness becomes part of one’s life story. Illness helps
to define one’s life and the sorts of lives people can
live. An important point about illness is that it is a
feature of human life that can be shared with others,
through, for example, conversation. By sharing these
experiences, people can construct a narrative account
of their illness (e.g. Bulow, 2003; Clouston, 2003;
Zakrzewski & Hector, 2004).
Illness, whether it is life-threatening or not,
causes a range of emotional responses in the person
including feelings of anxiety, fear, powerlessness,
and vulnerability. Feeling anxious and worried is
natural during illness. The fear of physical symp-
toms such as pain and the fear of dying are also nat-
ural responses to illness. Feelings created by illness
and the features imposed upon one by the dehu-
manizing process of hospitalization (e.g. Norman,
1980; Miller, 1985; Hirschfeld, 2003) promote feel-
ings of powerlessness. If patients cannot exert any
control over their illness, environment, and care or
if this is possible but only to a minimal extent, then
feelings of powerlessness might naturally develop.
Feelings of powerlessness and loss of control can be
















chronic mental illness. In the words of Pellegrino &
Thomasma (1993, p. 42),
 
sick persons must bare their weaknesses, compromise their
dignity, and reveal intimacies of body and mind.
 
Patients might feel vulnerable because they are
aware that there is potential to be hurt both physically
and emotionally. Feelings of fear and powerlessness
will perhaps contribute to a general sense of feeling
vulnerable: being wide open to harm. These feelings
can be intensified when the ill person requires help
from nurses either at home or in hospital. Patients are
reliant on nurses to relieve distressing symptoms, pro-
mote independence, and enable recovery. Ultimately,
when one is hospitalized, one is dependent upon help
from others, including nurses, to survive, recover, and




Since the middle part of the 20th century, the nurse–
patient relationship – seen in terms of human inter-
actions, excellent communication skills, and mutual
cooperation – has emerged as a central concept in
nursing theory and practice. Literature (e.g. Skid-
more, 1992; Wright, 1993; Monaghan, 1995; Speedy,
1999) identifies certain characteristics of a therapeu-
tic nurse–patient relationship including the idea that
this relationship should be patient-centred and col-
laborative. The development and sustenance of a
therapeutic nurse–patent relationship is a core role of
the nurse (e.g. Skidmore, 1992; Wright, 1993; Mon-
aghan, 1995; Speedy, 1999). While this is a complex










These areas include the idea that nurses should (1)
help the patient to survive and recover from illness;
(2) promote the patient’s independence; and (3) in
terminal illness, alleviate physical symptoms such as
pain and promote dignity.
At least, some patients believe that being a ‘good’
nurse and providing ‘high’-quality care centres on
nurses possessing and demonstrating several personal
attributes, qualities or skills. Traits such as kindness,
patience, and tolerance contribute to nurses deliver-
ing high-quality care (e.g. Beech & Norman, 1995),
while compassion is recognized as a crucial trait






The above conception of the nurse–patient rela-
tionship is held by patients to be extremely valuable,









., 2000). Of course, this
kind of helping relationship is only achievable if
nurses make themselves available to patients, spend
sufficient time with patients, and listen attentively to
what patients have to say. Unfortunately, literature
suggests that nurses are spending most of their time
on administrative tasks and only a small proportion
of their  time  is  spent  in  direct  contact  with





1979; Hurst & Howard, 1988; Martin, 1992; Whitting-
ton & McLaughlin, 2000).
It seems sensible then to suggest that if ‘high’-qual-
ity nursing care is to be delivered, critical reflection
is required on several topics including (1) the role of
a nurse; (2) the kind of interpersonal responses that
nurses ought to demonstrate; and (3) the character
traits that nurses ought to demonstrate in the delivery
of nursing care.
Kindness and honesty are important for the devel-
opment of a therapeutic nurse–patient relationship





These qualities are character traits; more accurately,
these qualities are examples of moral virtues. It is
therefore prudent to turn to moral philosophy and






Ancient Greek philosophy (e.g. Irwin, 1999) provides
an early account of the role of the virtues in human
lives, understood in terms of human nature, the good
life for humans and the notion of human flourishing.





 is ‘what is the good life for
man?’. Crudely, his response was living the life of
virtue according to reason and desires.





tle states that the soul consists of three kinds of
things: passions, faculties, and states of character.
 














Aristotle believed virtue is neither passions nor fac-





’ (Aristotle, 1980, p. 28).
He distinguished between moral and intellectual
virtue.  The  latter  was  taught  through  instruction























versely, moral virtue was acquired through exercising
the virtue, ‘moral virtue comes about as a result of
habit’ (Aristotle, 1980, p. 28). The emphasis is on the
word ‘habitual’. Taking honesty as an example,




 occasions – per-
haps when it is convenient to be so – does not posses
the virtue of honesty. On the Aristotelian view, the




 honest. For Aristotle, the
actions of a virtuous person spring from a steady
unchangeable character.
 
Assumptions about the meaning and use 
of ‘virtue’
 
One of the common criticisms of virtue ethics is that
it is circular in character: that by being virtuous –
exercising virtues such as honesty – one is a morally
good person but, to be morally ‘good’, one needs to
be virtuous. While this is one of the traditional criti-
cisms of virtue ethics, it does not fatally undermine
the coherence of virtue ethics. The term ‘virtue’





means ‘an excellence of character’ (Aristotle, 1980).
I shall not here defend the coherence of virtue ethics
further. However, with a fair degree of intellectual
authority, several contemporary virtue ethicists
counter the circular argument criticism (e.g. Slote,





Aristotle’s conception of a virtue fails to distinguish
virtues from vices because the latter are also charac-
ter traits manifested in habitual action. Pincoffs
(1986) provides one account of how to resolve this
problem. He claims that the virtues and vices should
be thought of as qualities that persons think about in
deciding whether someone should be avoided or
sought. He writes
 
Some sorts of person we prefer; others we avoid. . . . The
properties on our list can serve as reasons for preference or
avoidance (Pincoffs, 1986, p. 78).
 
Regarding the vices, most people would probably
wish to avoid meeting other people who are, for
instance, cruel, callous, mean or dishonest. These
kinds of character traits are not admirable either in
us or in others.
 
Virtues and roles 
 
Rachels (1999) provides a list of common virtues.
Examples include so-called other-regarding virtues
such as compassion, honesty, and patience. Social vir-
tues include justice and examples of other virtues are
assertiveness, temperance, and tolerance. The incul-
cation of the virtues depends upon one’s roles. Peo-
ple’s lives consist of many diverse roles and ends.
Rachels’s (1999) examples are an auto mechanic and
a teacher. He believes that an auto mechanic should
be honest, conscientious, and skilful, while a teacher
should be articulate, patient, and knowledgeable.
Imagine a lawyer whom I wish to act on my behalf. I
would like her to be intelligent, articulate, and coura-
geous. By exercising these traits, she will act well as
my legal advocate.
 
Virtues, character, and faring well
 
According to contemporary moral philosophers (e.g.
Hursthouse, 1999), moral virtues are character traits
that dispose one, their possessor, to habitually act,




Rachels (1999, p. 178)
believes that a virtue is ‘a trait of character, mani-
fested in habitual action that it is good for a person
to have’. The moral virtues are those that it is good
for everyone to have.
The virtues form part of one’s character; they are
an internal part of one’s identity. Moral obligations
and principles are external to the person; these social
constructs are imposed upon people from the outside
world e.g. professional obligations from the Nursing
and Midwifery Council (NMC, 2004). Such obliga-
















by people; hence, they are not necessarily compatible
with the kind of person one is. The moral virtues are
morally excellent character traits. Cultivating and
exercising the moral virtues is instrumental to leading
morally good lives. Exercising the moral virtues tends
to help people to fare well in life and helps others fare
well too. However, I stress that I am talking about
faring well in moral terms. Being dishonest and cheat-
ing people might help one to become financially
wealthy, but this is not living a morally good life.
Cultivating the moral virtues will help one to act,
think, and feel in morally excellent ways. I would add
that the virtues should be regarded as morally admi-
rable traits of character (Slote, 1992). People who
exercise moral virtues deserve to be praised and
admired because of the moral excellence of their
deeds, thoughts, and feelings, and because it can be
extremely difficult to cultivate the virtues.
 
Why should the virtues be valued? The example 
of kindness
 
The virtues are morally excellent character traits,
which help people to lead morally good lives and
deserve praise and admiration from others. A reason-





ing the virtues?’ As noted earlier, the virtues might
not be valued because it is not easy to be habitually
virtuous; one only needs to think about an other-
regarding virtue such as generosity to appreciate this
point. If one does not wish to lead a life of altruism,
then it is clear that one might not immediately under-
stand the value of other-regarding virtues; further-
more, it is clear that valuing the virtues will also
depend upon the particular virtue in question.
In an effort to demonstrate the value of the virtues,
I will look at the example of kindness. Robert is a
charity worker in Africa, helping to care for people
who are sick and dying. He is kind towards others. He
believes that being kind is crucial to his role because
he can see that those whom he cares about are helped
through his acts and feelings of kindness. Robert
works consistently hard to be kind towards others. By
acting, thinking, and feeling kindly, Robert carries out
his role well and others are helped through his kind-
ness. This example is limited to one other-regarding
virtue, namely, kindness, and it could be accused of
oversimplifying the truth. However, it serves to show
how the virtues are important in human lives; how, in
this scenario, Robert’s kindness helped others to fare
better in life and how it helped him to do well too.
Exercising the moral virtues, especially other-
regarding virtues such as kindness, is particularly
important when working with people who are
helpless and vulnerable.
 
Advantages of the virtues: rich action guidance 
and the ‘v-rules’
 
Obligation-based ethicists argue that the virtuous per-
son will have no idea what to do in particular dilem-
mas, because they argue that virtue ethics fails to come
up with any rules for conduct. Hursthouse (1999)
believes that this is wrong. In her view, people have
access to a whole range of virtues and vices and, within
the structure of these virtues and vices, there is con-
siderable moral guidance. For example, the virtues
include compassion, honesty, and patience. The virtu-
ous person would therefore characteristically be com-
passionate, true to her word, and patient in the
circumstances. Virtuous persons would not be non-
compassionate or cruel, lie or impatient. Hursthouse
believes that despite one’s own initial uncertainty, it
is possible to have a very good idea of what the vir-
tuous person would do. For example, Hursthouse asks,
 
Would she lie in her teeth to acquire an unmerited advan-
tage? No for that would be both dishonest and unjust. . . .
Might she keep a death-bed promise even though living
people would benefit from its being broken? Yes, for she is
true to her word. And so on. (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 36)
 
Virtue terms, such as ‘kind’, honest’, and ‘patient’,
and the opposite vice terms, ‘unkind’ (or ‘cruel’), ‘dis-
honest’, and ‘impatient’, provide greater explanatory
force compared with obligations and deontic (duty-
based) terms (Hursthouse, 1999). Anscombe (1997)
heavily influences Hursthouse’s view, according to
Anscombe, instead of using deontic terms,
 
It would be a great improvement if, instead of ‘morally
wrong’ one always named a genus such as ‘untruthful’,
‘unchaste’, ‘unjust’ . . . the answer would sometimes be clear
at once’. (Anscombe, 1997, p. 43)
 














Hursthouse believes that people can gain a lot of
‘invaluable action guidance . . . from avoiding courses
of action that are irresponsible, feckless . . . harsh . . .
feeble . . . self-indulgent’ (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 42). In
other words, one can gain considerable insight into
what to do by thinking hard about the virtue and vice
terms and the sorts of deeds expected of someone
who exercises these traits. Furthermore, Hursthouse
believes that virtue ethics ‘comes up with a large num-
ber of rules’ (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 36). Virtue ethics














But virtue ethics also tells one what not to do, e.g.
‘each vice [is] a prohibition – do not do what is dis-
honest, uncharitable, mean’ (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 36).
Hursthouse (1999) calls these the v-rules and, in





 present an account of right action that
includes rules, so denying the common criticism that
it fails to.
It can be seen that the language of the virtues and
vices provides a richer degree of action guidance than
the barren language of obligation-based ethics. As a
child, one regularly hears virtue and vice terms from
parents and other adults and as one develops through
adulthood, words such as ‘fair’ and ‘kind’ are replaced
with deontic language, especially the central concepts
of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ action. I agree with Benn (1998)
that the use of virtue and vice terms can prove to be
helpful in an attempt to gain action guidance. Virtue
ethics aims to make moral goodness and badness
prior to the traditional pivotal moral considerations
of moral rightness and wrongness. In exercising the
virtues, the moral agent needs to strike a balance
between the excessive and deficient extremes of the
trait of character, what Aristotle (1980) calls ‘hitting
the mean’. For example, in exercising the virtue of
courage, the moral agent needs to refrain from being
reckless (the excessive extreme) or cowardly (the
deficient extreme). Hitting the mean essentially con-
cerns the use of moral judgement and reason in exer-
cising traits of character. This complex endeavour is
different from the pivotal endeavour of obligation-
based moral theories i.e. to determine the moral
rightness or wrongness of an action/omission. Indeed,
instead of such deontic considerations, strong ver-
sions of virtue ethics focus upon the notions of moral
goodness and badness (this is discussed further in
 




Problems with the virtues: identifying the virtues
 
Disagreement exists on which character traits are
virtues.  For  example,  one  person  compiling  a  list
of virtues might believe that honesty, patience, and
tolerance are virtues. Another person may disagree,
instead favouring compassion and justice. However,
I am sceptical that a person who advocates the virtu-
ous approach would, on the one hand, defend honesty
and, on the other hand, reject compassion. A virtue
on my view is a character trait, habitually performed,
which disposes one to act, think, and feel in morally
excellent ways. Those who exercise the virtues
deserve praise and admiration. The fact that there are
so many plausible virtues is not sufficient reason to





Instead of the above claim, perhaps a more power-









view runs counter to the common view that numerous










tues, therefore ruling out other candidates such as
compassion and justice. I would reject this claim. It
seems to me implausible to believe that the moral life
can be exhausted by reference to three character
traits. One who suggests that there are only three (or
fewer) virtues needs to respond to several questions,





? In other words, without the virtue of jus-
tice, is it possible to be morally good and if so, how?
If the response to this question is affirmative, then
one must be committed to a view of moral goodness
that excludes the common idea that moral goodness
involves being a just and fair person.
 
Obligation-based moral theories in 
general and nursing ethics
 
Obligation-based moral theories are popular in both
contemporary general and nursing ethics. The con-
















ern society. Moral obligations, principles and rules
and the nature and consequences of actions are mor-
ally important features. However, obligations are
socially constructed and imposed upon one by a range
of authorities such as law, ethicists, and the NMC
(2004). But, an obligation does not exist nor does it
do anything in isolation, a person needs to conceive,
interpret, and apply the obligation to others in mor-
ally complex situations.
Obligation-based moral theories have several
well-established flaws. Regarding consequentialism
(e.g. Frey, 2000), these include the difficulty in pre-
dicting the actual consequences of actions and omis-
sions and an extreme focus on the notion of ‘right
action’ Hursthouse, 1999). Furthermore, act (e.g.
Frey, 2000), rule (e.g. Lyons, 1965), and indirect
forms of consequentialism (e.g. Hare, 1981) fail to
take seriously several other morally important fea-
tures. For instance, they: (1) fail to provide a rich
account of moral character; (2) fail to provide a rig-
orous account of the distinctiveness of persons and
the significance of relationships in human life (e.g.
Scheffler, 1992); and (3) fail to acknowledge the
important role played by emotions in the moral life
of people. On the latter, Hursthouse (1999) argues
that virtuous moral agents ought to feel ‘moral
remainder’ both during and after their involvement
in a range of moral dilemmas. The virtuous agent will
feel emotions such as regret, anguish, guilt, hurt, loss,
despair, and remorse. It is morally appropriate to
feel these emotions because the virtuous agent is
fully aware of the distressing nature of moral dilem-
mas, which are saturated with potentially damaging
moral conflicts and uncertainties.
Some of the well-known flaws of deontology (e.g.
Davis, 1990) are that (1) it does not provide adequate
action-guidance until its second premise where it
actually specifies what a correct moral obligation,
principle or rule is; (2) it over-focuses on the notion
of ‘right action’ rather than on the notion of moral
goodness; (3) it fails to tell one how to settle conflicts
between moral principles and obligations (Hurst-
house, 1999); and (4) as with consequentialism, it also
fails to account properly for the significance of rela-
tionships in human life (e.g. Williams, 1981). Because
of these (and other) flaws and omissions, obligation-
based moral theories in general ethics are incomplete
and inadequate.
This critical evaluation of obligation-based moral
theories fares little better in nursing ethics. Despite
the recognition that nurses should display the moral
virtues, these moral theories, particularly the ‘four
principles’ approach (Gillon, 1986; Edwards, 1996;
Beauchamp & Childress, 2001), remain extremely
popular and widespread in the nursing ethics litera-









., 2001). Their popularity continues
despite sustained critiques (e.g. Clouser & Gert, 1990;
Clouser & Gert, 1994).
Why are obligation-based moral theories so popu-
lar despite their flaws? At least three reasons spring
to mind. First, obligation-based moral theories are
popular in general ethics; it makes sense to suppose
that popular theories in general ethics will then be
utilized in professional ethics. Second, despite the
widespread view that patient-centred and holistic
nursing care ought to be key objectives of contempo-
rary nursing practice, a biomedical focus on practice




., 2001). The epis-
temological paradigm that grounds the biomedical
model and medical practice is empiricism, with a firm
focus on, for example, the disease process, making
diagnoses, identifying clinical needs and planning and
delivering effective treatments. Consequentialism
focuses upon the outcomes of actions, while one of
the main foci in healthcare practice is on clinical out-
comes. Therefore, it makes sense that doctors and
nurses have adopted a consequentialist approach to
moral reasoning that is very much in keeping with
empiricism. Third, hospitals are large, complex insti-
tutions, which operate efficiently in part because of a
system of rules, regulations, and policies. Such rules
are generally utilitarian or at least consequentialist in
content and scope. Rules aim to maximize the effec-
tiveness of the institution. Such familiarity of and
reliance upon rules helps to explain why medics and
nurses favour rule-based deontological ethics over
other alternative moral theories.
Obligation-based moral theories, e.g. the ‘four prin-
ciples’ approach (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001), can
provide nurses, in particular novices, with a structured
framework that can assist the identification of ethical
 














issues and promote the resolution of complex moral
dilemmas. However, there are several disadvantages
of utilizing traditional accounts of obligation-based
moral theories in nursing practice. I shall highlight
just three. First, obligation-based moral theories place
a firm emphasis on resolving moral dilemmas. There
is a danger that an assumption is made that all moral
dilemmas can be ‘satisfactorily’ resolved. However,
such a simplistic view is problematic. Hursthouse
(1999) distinguishes between resolvable, irresolvable,
and tragic dilemmas. This distinction is ignored in
much of the obligation-based nursing ethics literature
with the result that the important issue of how a nurse




 during and after these sorts of
moral dilemmas is overlooked. This criticism is, how-
ever, addressed by several care-orientated theorists
in nursing ethics who appreciate the distinction
between moral dilemmas and the important role
played by emotion in the moral lives of nurses and
patients (e.g. Nortvedt, 1998; Johnstone & Fry, 2002).
Second, act-utilitarianism and some traditional
accounts of deontology neglect the role of moral wis-
dom and judgement in the moral life of nurses. This
is in sharp contrast to the reality of contemporary








., 2000). It seems that the reality of clinical nursing
is not acknowledged by obligation-based moral theo-
ries. Third, obligation-based theories, especially deon-
tology, fail to provide sufficient action-guidance and
direction to resolve the myriad of conflicts between
duties that arise in nursing practice. Attempts at lex-
ical ordering (Hare, 1981) and specifying moral prin-
ciples (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001) do not go far
enough. Nurses are left without the necessary concep-
tual tools with which to clarify and resolve the numer-
ous complex, multidimensional moral conflicts.
 
Virtue ethics: tenets, types, merits, 
and problems
 
Having articulated several important flaws central to
obligation-based moral theories, a sensible question
is ‘where should one turn to discover a more complete
account of the moral life?’ My response is to nomi-
nate virtue ethics, the moral theory that has the vir-
tues at its core.
Critics allege that there is no such thing as a theory
of virtue; for example, Rachels states that there is ‘no
settled body of doctrine on which all these writers
[virtue ethicists] agree’ (Rachels, 1999, p. 177). Of
course, this criticism can also be levelled at the many
distinct versions of obligation-based moral theories.
What is not in doubt, however, is that versions of
virtue ethics share a set of concerns, which are largely
ignored in obligation-based ethics. I shall use the term
‘tenet’, because these concerns mark out virtue ethics
as a distinct moral theory and a credible alternative
to consequentialism and deontology. I shall list four
















It provides a natural and convincing account of
moral motivation.
 
Supplementary and strong versions of 
virtue ethics
 
Versions of virtue ethics can be divided into supple-
mentary and strong theories. Supplementary theories
hold that the virtues and a corresponding virtue ethics
require assistance from a version of obligation-based
moral theories. This ‘essentialist’ (Pence, 1991)
approach combines an account of right action pro-
vided by consequentialism or deontology with an
emphasis on moral character provided by the virtues
and virtue ethics. The account of the virtues is offered
as a supplement to an obligation-based theory of right
action.
 
Supplementary virtue ethics: weak and 
moderate versions
 
Supplementary versions of virtue ethics can be fur-
ther subdivided into those that hold that (1) obliga-
tions and right action are more important than the
virtues and moral character in morality and those that
hold that (2) the virtues and moral character are more
important in morality than obligations and right
action. The former can be called ‘weak’ and the latter
‘moderate’ versions of virtue ethics.
Examples of supplementary virtue ethics in medi-
















ethicists believe that moral principles possess greater
moral force than the virtues. Without moral princi-
ples, virtue ethics is left unable to adequately pre-
scribe action-guidance for doctors. Pellegrino and
Thomasma see a strong link between moral principles
and corresponding virtues, each supplementing and
informing the other.
Examples of supplementary virtue ethics in nursing
include Brody (1988), Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva
(1996) and McKie & Swinton (2000). Brody (1988)
published an influential paper in which she examined
the supplementary role of the virtues and caring in
adult nursing. I believe this is a moderate version of
a tentative, underdeveloped account of the virtues.
Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva (1996) discuss the concept
of virtue and the role of virtue ethics, as a necessary
but insufficient complement to rule-based ethics in
psychiatric nursing. The authors argue that the virtues
enable a nurse to evaluate an ethical dilemma, iden-
tify all the morally relevant features, and then apply
the appropriate ethical rules and principles to the
dilemma. The authors claim that virtues help to pro-
vide the right motivation for the nurse in order to
decide which moral rule to obey and follow. This sup-
plementary approach has its merits; for example, at
least the authors recognize the importance of the vir-
tues in moral decision making in nursing. It is, how-
ever, unclear whether the authors would argue for a
weak or moderate position. My view is that this ver-
sion represents a weak version of virtue ethics
because virtue is held to be necessary and less pivotal
to morality in nursing than the role of moral obliga-
tions, principles or rules. Finally McKie & Swinton’s
(2000) account is steeped in Aristotle (1980) and pays
homage to MacIntyre (1985), both of whom advocate
a strong virtue ethics; however, despite this, McKie





Strong versions of virtue ethics (e.g. Aristotle, 1980;
MacIntyre, 1985; Slote, 1992; Hursthouse, 1999; Slote,
2001; Swanton, 2003) argue that virtue ethics and the
virtues are capable of doing all the work of ethics.
Rachels calls this, ‘an independent theory of ethics
that is complete in itself’ (Rachels, 1999, p. 189).
According to strong virtue ethics, one’s moral char-
acter, moral motivations, and the justification of acts
are couched solely in the virtues. Strong virtue ethi-
cists reject the use of deontic language such as ‘right’
and ‘wrong’. They follow Anscombe (1997) in want-
ing to jettison all deontic notions from ethics. Strong
virtue ethicists would justify for instance, not lying to
someone, not because it is ‘wrong’, ‘unethical’ or ‘it
breaks the moral rule “do not lie to others”’ but
because ‘it is dishonest’. Instead of deontic terms, the
language of the virtues and vices is employed.
The two central questions in normative ethics –
what should I do? and how should I be? – are not
necessarily incompatible, despite the objection from
obligation-based ethicists that action guidance is
ignored in virtue ethics. One could generalize and
claim that obligation-based moral theories are act-
centred and virtue ethics is agent-centred, because
the latter makes moral character/goodness so impor-





 than act-centred (Hursthouse,
1999). Some obligation-based ethicists do interpret
virtue ethics in this simplistic way. Perhaps they mis-
conceive virtue ethics because its revival only began
in 1958 (Anscombe, 1997) and as such, it is an imma-
ture moral theory and one that is poorly understood
compared with the traditional and well-known obli-
gation-based moral theories.
Supplementary versions of virtue ethics are hybrids
and as such are potentially theoretically incompatible
accounts. A strong version of virtue ethics is a plau-
sible option because it is a coherent single theory.
Strong versions of virtue ethics provide adequate
action guidance because they encourage agents to
think hard about the nature and content of the virtues
and vices and encourage agents to act according to
the v-rules. Because of these reasons, I favour a
strong version of virtue ethics.
 
Objections to virtue ethics
 
However, there are several common objections to
virtue ethics (e.g. Pence, 1991; Louden, 1997; Pettit,
 














1997; Benn, 1998; Rachels, 1999). I shall focus on only
one objection, namely, the conflicts of virtues
problem.
Several ethicists including Benn (1998) and Rach-
els (1999) identify conflicts between the virtues as a
serious problem for virtue ethics. How is one meant
to resolve situations where two or more virtues have
been identified as important? For instance, is honesty,
in a given situation, more important than justice?
I shall respond by making three points, although
several other responses are open to the virtue ethicist
(e.g. Armstrong, 2004). First, it is not true to say that
a person will have no idea what to do simply because
both honesty and kindness are virtues. One needs to
think hard about what honest and kind persons are
like; for example, what characteristically would hon-
est and kind persons do? What behaviours does one
expect from honest and kind persons? What acts
would honest and kind persons carry out? One should
take into account particular circumstances and con-
texts; these details will help to shed some light on
which virtue is thought more important in a given
situation. My second point is that both kindness and
honesty are moral virtues, examples of moral excel-
lences that should be praised and admired. Acting
from the virtue of kindness and acting from the virtue





cruelly and dishonestly are vices, examples of acting
badly. Thus, the conflict is between two moral excel-
lences, which in different ways will help their pos-
sessor and benefactor(s) to flourish. Third, act-
consequentialists hold that applying the single rule of
their theory will reveal the morally right course of
action. This reading of act-consequentialism means
that no room is given to utilizing judgement in moral
decision making. While it is true to say that several
contemporary deontologists recognize the impor-
tance of versatility, flexibility, judgement, and moral
perception in moral decision making (e.g. Herman,
1993; Baron, 1995), it remains the case that several
traditional accounts of obligation-based moral theo-




., 2001), condemn the use of judgement to resolve
conflicts between moral obligations and principles.
However, virtue ethics acknowledges that conflicts
between virtues will arise and it holds that exercising
judgement is fundamentally important to morality
and to human flourishing.
 
The virtue-based approach to moral 
decision making in nursing practice
 
In this section, I shall first provide a brief overview of
the virtue-based approach to moral decision making
in nursing practice. I shall then describe moral wis-
dom in more detail. Next, I shall briefly describe the
virtue-based helping relationship and I conclude this
section by mentioning some merits and criticisms of
the virtue-based approach.
Three features characterize the virtue-based
approach to moral decision making: (1) exercising the
moral virtues, e.g. compassion (e.g. Blum, 1980; Pel-
legrino & Thomasma, 1993; Lutzen & Barbosa da
Silva, 1996; von Dietze & Orb, 2000); (2) utilizing
moral judgement; and (3) utilizing moral wisdom (e.g.
Murdoch, 1970; Hursthouse, 1999). I shall now exam-




Moral wisdom is a complex phenomenon that
includes (at least) three components: moral percep-
tion, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination. I
believe that each component is equally important to
the major aim of moral wisdom, i.e. to help a nurse
to think of and deliver a diverse range of morally
good practices, interventions, and activities. Much has
been written about the three components that make
up moral wisdom. I shall not develop this debate
further; instead, I shall merely present a brief over-
view of each component.
Moral perception (e.g. Blum, 1980; Lutzen & Nor-
din, 1993; Nortvedt, 1998) refers to one’s capacity to
see, and provide meaning in, the ‘morally relevant
features’ of observations, situations, interactions, and
experiences. I believe that these morally relevant fea-
tures include: moral virtues, the outcomes of actions,
intuitions, moral rights, motives, religious beliefs,




., 2000). Morally perceptive nurses are able to see
a wide range of morally relevant features and discern
meaning in them. Regarding moral sensitivity (e.g.















person’s needs suggests that one is able to identify
one’s needs, perhaps more easily than another person
is able to. The phrase ‘morally sensitive’ connotes a
positive and admirable quality. In contrast, if I am
insensitive to a patient’s feelings, then I might fail to
perceive her feelings and, as a result, I might act as
though her feelings do not matter to me. To be a
morally sensitive nurse, it is insufficient to merely
perceive patients’ needs. One’s perceptions ought to
produce a morally appropriate response; perceptions
also help to form one’s moral motives. Morally sensi-
tive nurses assimilate a wide range of information, act
upon it, and respond to patients’ needs and interests
in morally good ways. Regarding moral imagination,
empathy and moral imagination (e.g. Baillie, 1996;
Yegdich, 1999) are closely linked. Or at least the
former involves the latter. Perhaps empathy is a nec-
essary, but not sufficient component of imagination.
It seems to me that the activity of imagination
requires one to put oneself in another person’s posi-
tion (e.g. Scott, 2000). Important questions include
‘how would I feel if the nurse lied to me?’ and ‘how
would I feel if the nurse spoke to me in such a callous
way?’ Moral imagination can be utilized by nurses to
reflect on what it might be like to be a patient in a
specific set of circumstances.
The virtue-based helping relationship
I view the helping relationship between a nurse and
a patient as one grounded in moral virtues; I refer to
this as a virtue-based helping relationship. Depending
upon the morally relevant features, nurses will need
to exercise a wide range of moral virtues if they wish
to respond to patients in morally good ways. I shall
not attempt to present a long list of ‘essential’ virtues
because this list would be extremely long and subjec-
tive and, as a result, I am not sure that it would be a
valuable endeavour. However, for illustrative pur-
poses, some examples of moral virtues that are impor-
tant for the development and sustenance of morally
good helping relationships are compassion (including
benevolence or kindness), courage, respectfulness,
patience, tolerance, justice, trustworthiness, and hon-
esty. I will not examine these virtues in detail,
although I aim to do so in a subsequent paper.
Instead, I will sketch the relevance of three virtues to
nursing practice. First, I suggest that the virtue of
compassion is the moral foundation of the helping
relationship between nurse and patient. Second, I
suggest that courage is a moral virtue needed by a
nurse if she wishes to be an advocate for a patient
(e.g. Breen, 1992; Hewitt, 2002) and third, I suggest
that the virtue of respectfulness is one of the virtues
necessary to empower patients. I realize that to
develop a more rigorous account of the virtue-based
approach, further investigation, both philosophical
and empirical, is required on the nature of the moral
virtues and their place within nursing practice.
Merits of the virtue-based approach in 
nursing practice
There are several important merits of the virtue-based
approach (Armstrong, 2004). I shall mention just four.
First, this approach accurately reflects the language
of the virtues and vices, e.g. ‘fair’, ‘well’, and ‘care’
that nurses use on a daily basis (Armstrong et al.,
2000). Second, this approach places a firm emphasis
upon the crucial role played by emotion including
moral remainder (Hursthouse, 1999) in the moral
lives of patients and nurses. Third, this approach
makes pivotal the importance of using judgement and
moral wisdom to enable nurses to make morally good
choices and decisions with patients in different cir-
cumstances. Fourth, this approach places a firm
emphasis upon moral education, e.g. the importance
of morally (and clinically) good role models (e.g.
Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva, 1996; Parsons et al., 2001).
While obligation-based moral theories focus prima-
rily on the notions of moral rightness and wrongness,
the virtue-based approach focuses upon moral good-
ness and badness. And, unlike some traditional
accounts of obligation-based moral theories, which
can fairly be described as rigid and inflexible, the
virtue-based approach can be described as context-
dependent, relational, and particularist.
Criticisms of the virtue-based approach in 
nursing practice
Of course, like all moral theories, the virtue-based
approach can also be criticized. I have already dis-
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cussed the conflicts of virtues problem and the criti-
cism that this approach makes assumptions about the
nature of virtues and goodness (Armstrong, 2004). I
shall briefly mention two further problems. First,
because of the ambiguity and disagreement in identi-
fying the virtues, this approach is guilty of moral rel-
ativism (e.g. Benn, 1998; Rachels, 1999). Second, this
approach is alleged to be unable to account for per-
sons who exercise excessive virtue; for example, a
nurse who is completely honest with patients in all
contexts (I aim to discuss this major concern in a
subsequent paper).
MacIntyre’s account of the virtues 
and the virtue-based approach in 
nursing practice
While the philosophical foundation for the virtue-
based approach is adequate, the work of MacIntyre
(e.g. MacIntyre, 1985) provides a more secure, deeper
foundation. MacIntyre’s account of the virtues as set
forth in After Virtue (MacIntyre, 1985) is interpreted
in the form of three theses: (1) the role and impor-
tance of a narrative conception of the self in morality;
(2) the meaning and nature of practices, goods, and
the virtues; and (3) the role and importance of a
tradition of enquiry in morality.
MacIntyre’s account of the virtues (e.g. Horton &
Mendus, 1994) is context-dependant, relational, and
particularist. Although MacIntyre fails to discuss
medicine or nursing as a practice, his account of the
virtues is highly suitable for the virtue-based
approach to moral decision making in nursing prac-
tice. For example, I suggest that his account recog-
nizes the importance of allowing patients to tell their
narratives, it acknowledges the importance of inter-
personal responses and it acknowledges that ques-
tions about personal identify are fundamentally
important for nurses, e.g. ‘who am I?’, ‘what kind of
nurse am I?’, and ‘how ought I to relate to this patient
and my colleagues?’
I conceive nursing as a purposive practice (Miller,
1994). Nursing is a complex and coherent form of
socially established human activity that aims at pro-
viding social goods and demonstrating human excel-
lences. While it is difficult to articulate the internal
goods of nursing (e.g. Sellman, 2000), it is plausible
to suggest that these relate to nurses feeling certain
positive emotions, which they feel when they are
helping patients (e.g. Moir & Abraham, 1996). I
suggest that the development and sustenance of a
virtue-based helping relationship, the exercise of
moral wisdom and feeling valued by patients and rel-
atives are examples of the internal goods of contem-
porary nursing practice.
Nurses ought to examine the nature of specific vir-
tues and examine the specific needs of patients in
their particular clinical environment. To counter the
charge of moral relativism, self-reflection and reflec-
tion on the role of a nurse and the ends of nursing
will help to shed some light on which traits of char-
acter are virtues. I suggest that nurses who exercise
the virtues will help to sustain the practice of nursing
and prevent the marginalization of the virtues.
Regarding the MacIntyrian idea of a tradition of
enquiry, each individual nurse is part of a history.
Each person is a bearer of a tradition of enquiry, an
intellectual set of ideas – an argument – that situates
the practice of nursing. The history of nursing as a
profession, the history of nurse education, and the
histories of each person entering the nursing profes-
sion all operate within a tradition of enquiry.
Traditions are dynamic; they change to meet the
needs of generations. The virtue-based approach is an
example of a tradition of moral enquiry, while the
biomedical model is a tradition of empirical or scien-
tific enquiry.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued for a strong – action-
guiding – version of virtue ethics for nursing practice.
I am aware that the virtue-based approach has several
problems that need to be addressed. Future research
– both empirical and philosophical – is needed to
further investigate several issues espoused in this
paper. For example, more insight is required on the
role and value of specific virtues in different nursing
environments, on the nature and resolution of con-
flicts between virtues, and more information could be
gathered from patients on whether they perceive vir-
tuous nursing care (e.g. Beech & Norman, 1995; Arm-
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strong et al., 2000). Moreover, more work is needed
to understand the nature of making moral judge-
ments, the role of moral wisdom in moral decision
making , whether students of nursing can learn to be
virtuous (e.g. Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva, 1996), and
how the virtue-based approach can be taught more
widely in both pre- and post-registration nurse edu-
cation (e.g. Parsons et al., 2001).
Despite these concerns, a strong version of virtue
ethics and the virtue-based approach to moral deci-
sion making in nursing practice have many significant
merits. These merits help to distinguish this approach
as a plausible alternative to the traditional obligation-
based moral theories that have long dominated nurs-
ing ethics. As noted in Illness, emotions, and the nurs-
ing–patient relationship section, there is a major
emphasis in contemporary nursing on patient-cen-
tred, collaborative, and ‘high’-quality care. It seems
to me that ‘high’-quality care and virtuous care are
synonymous. Because of these (and other) reasons,
virtue ethics and the virtue-based approach to moral
decision making in nursing practice ought now to be
acknowledged, taken more seriously, and investi-
gated further.
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